This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions and a continuous action space. Given that individuals regularly fail to apply rational timing, we refrain from implementing optimal timing of decisions...

This paper analyzes a Hotelling-type game in a mixed oligopoly, where firms can either enter the market in period 1, facing demand uncertainty, or postpone their entry, in order to acquire complete information. It is shown that, for a high (low) level of uncertainty, there is a pure...

This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2010</CitationRef>), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form...</citationref>

This paper examines endogenous timing in an international tax competition model. Unlike existing studies, governments are assumed to decide not only tax rates but also whether they are set early or late. The Nash equilibrium provides four conclusions for alternative double tax allowances. First,...

This paper analyzes the issue of leadership when two jurisdictions are engaged in tax competition and capital tax revenues are used to finance the provision of local public goods. For that purpose we consider a timing game between the two asymmetric jurisdictions. On the first stage...

In a family context with endogenous timing, multiple public goods and alternative parental instruments, we show that the optimal timing for the sequential-action game played by rotten kids and a parent depends crucially on whether the kids are homogeneous or heterogeneous. For homogeneous kids,...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...

This paper builds a theory of endogenous role distribution (leader, follower, and Nash player) and of endogenous choice for the type of competition strategy (price and quantity) in a product differentiated duopoly model. We examine an extended game by adding a pre-play stage in which duopoly...

This Paper analyses endogenous price leadership in a duopolistic market with differentiated products and symmetrically informed firms. We study the effects of deadlines and discounting in a standard endogenous leadership model. We show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the...