This paper examines the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Our main concern is to examine the effect of delegation on the way players think about the game and how the play it.

We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent`s...

I illustrate the convergence to Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining outcome of the solutions of the finite-horizon truncations of that game. The depiction is new, and hopefully instructive, and has the flavour of international trade diagrams.

It gives an informal definition of the main elements of a game: the set of players, the concept of a move and of a strategy, the normal and the extended form, a first introduction to the description of information, the set of results that can be reached and the value each player attaches to a...

A simple proof of existence of a non cooperative Nash equilibrium is briefly discussed, together with an introduction to the problems arising from its uniqueness or non uniqueness, to the properties which can be ascribed to an equilibrium and those connected with the search for an equilibrium.

The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its...

After introducing the binary relation of domination and its properties, one defines the concept of non dominated strategies and some conditions for their existence, the concept of solution of a game, that of rationalizability, that of best reply and the concept of non cooperative Nash equilibrium.