rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

allow for higher-order uncertainty about rationality. We introduce interim correlated p-rationalizability (ICRp) as a … the same time, we show that Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) deeper results on the structure of rationalizability, most …

allow for higher-order uncertainty about rationality. We introduce interim correlated p-rationalizability (ICRp) as a … the same time, we show that Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) deeper results on the structure of rationalizability, most …

constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …