We estimate a model of strategic voting by adopting a recently developed inequality-based estimator in a discrete-choice framework. The difficulty of identification comes from the fact that preference and voting behavior do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence for strategic voters....

experiment on alternative voting schemes.

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction...

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction...

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction...

This paper studies how signaling can facilitate the functioning of a market with classical adverse selection problems. Using data from Prosper.com, an online credit market where loans are funded through auctions, we provide evidence that reserve interest rates that borrowers post can serve as a...

This paper models the dynamics of fundraising, campagin spending, and accumulation of war chest in the context of U.S. House elections. We structurally estimate the model using campaign finance data and vote share data from 1984 to 2004. A salient feature of U.S. Congressional Elections is that...