We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a...

A central bank possesses various instruments to provide liquidity. These are either outright monetary transactions (OMT) of securities or other refinancing facilities, primarily repos, which are executed with standard tenders. The eligible securities (i.e. bonds or equities) need to conform with...

This paper proposes a two-stage sealed-bid model for the execution of blind portfolios. An asset manager auctions a package of securities to a set of brokers who are unaware of the specific details about individual securities. We prove that our mechanism reduces the costs of execution for the...

A central bank possesses various instruments to provide liquidity. These are either outright monetary transactions (OMT) of securities or other refinancing facilities, primarily repos, which are executed with standard tenders. The eligible securities (i.e. bonds or equities) need to conform with...

We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio, and we perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup, mitigating bidders' free-riding incentives and further...