If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting interests in designing managerial incentives: one for profit orientation to reduce wage, and the other for sales orientation to gain in output competition. The net effect depends...

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining...

We develop a model of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining to study efficiency and distributional implications in monopoly and in Cournot duopoly. In both markets delegation causes underproduction, but has contrasting implications for bargaining pie and for its distribution. In...

This paper examines the regulatory authority’s decision, following a report from the legal firm, on monitoring commercial piracy in a market characterised by asymmetric product differentiation. I show that with ex-post monitoring the government will monitor piracy under both price and quantity...

In India, the mother-in-law is all powerful. At least they are often portrayed as such in Indian popular culture. Similarly, in the socio-economic literature, the influence of the Indian mother-in-law is often taken for granted. However, most of the empirical evidence relies on qualitative data...

As a result of the strong desire for sons in India, millions of female foetuses have been aborted over the last three decades alongside an abnormally high mortality rate of infant girls. Given the extent of the problem, a large amount of literature exists on the overall root causes of son...