This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

This paper presents some convex stochastic programming models for single and multi-period inventory control problems where the market demand is random and order quantities need to be decided before demand is realized. Both models minimize the expected losses subject to risk aversion constraints...