In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some … others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of …

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some … others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of …

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some … others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of …

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects … deterrence effects before leniency programs were introduced. Previous simulations of the effects of fines ignore the different … under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant …

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from … settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program … fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative. …

in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust …

We estimate, using event study techniques, the impact of the main events in an antitrust investigation on a firm …

preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 … deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0 …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature … distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …