conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e.,remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from theeconomics of crime literature. We find the …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an … detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is … deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. …

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from … settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program … fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative. …

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying … changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has … strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 … deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0 …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature … distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an … detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is … deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature … distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the …