In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

This paper considers the issue of disclosure of hedging choices. It is shown that disclosure is the preferred choice of both managers and shareholders if it removes completely the informational asymmetry among the manager and the shareholders concerning the business opportunities and risks faced...

In this paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the chief executive in the formulation of corporate strategy. Unlike traditional applications of agency theory, we allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem. We argue that CEOs will have an...

This study investigates the capital sources and uses of firms that are conducting stock repurchase transactions for the first time, both prior and subsequent to those financial operations. We hypothesize that this capital and cash flow analysis may shed some light about the relative importance...

We present univariate and multivariate evidence to show that firms which engage in initial stock repurchases have some specific economic and financial attributes when compared to size-and industry-matched firms. We find that initial repurchase firms are younger, have lower leverage and operating...

In this paper, we study the timing of initial stock repurchases for a sample of firms from their IPO onwards, using panel adjusted logistic regressions and hazard models to examine which variables may predict and theoretical hypotheses may explain these transactions. First, we find that initial...