We present a selection of seminar slides based on our 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper, "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640552" Managerial Miscalibration. Using a large panel of CFO forecasts of S&P 500 returns, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated,...

The Equity risk-premium and volatility puzzle - is it possible to have a high equity premium and a low risk-free rate with a plausible risk aversion- have received a great deal of attention but beyond this question, the fundamental issues of that puzzle are the followings: what are the economic...

This study shows that firms regard stock price fragility - exposure to non-fundamental demand shocks stemming from the composition of equity ownership - as a salient corporate risk. We model ex-ante corporate responses to higher potential for future stock market misvaluation and then empirically...

We empirically investigate the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. This empirical study is suitable because the general theoretical predictions have not been derived yet, and due to the interaction effects, they may not be necessary identical to those which were...

We study business uncertainty in high- versus low-volatility environments by surveying over 31,000 managers across 41 countries. We elicit subjective probability distributions for future own-firm sales and measure firm-level uncertainty with their mean absolute deviations. Analogously, we...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to model asymmetric information and study the profitability of venture capital (VC) backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Our mixtures approach endogenously separates IPOs into differentiated groups based on their returns’ determinants. We also...

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to model asymmetric information and study the profitability of venture capital (VC) backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Our mixtures approach endogenously separates IPOs into differentiated groups based on their returns' determinants. We also analyze...

A theory of capital structure in which costs associated with asymmetric information are the sole friction is used to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order theory. In the model, both the amount of debt and the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants are considered to be...

We present a tradeoff theory of capital structure in which costs associated with asymmetric information are the sole friction. By considering both the amount of debt as well as the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants a more complete characterization of debt structure is examined...

We propose a theory of optimal firm financing given nested information problems of adverse selection and agency cost. We prove that there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium with novel features: First, three types of optimal contracts arise endogenously, i.e., equity, transparent debt...