We study whether firms that voluntarily restrict insider trading have lower incentives for earnings management. Using a large sample of US firms, we measure these restrictions based on the extent to which insider transactions happen shortly after quarterly earnings announcements. We find that...

Despite abundant empirical evidence of informed trading ahead of major corporate events, no such evidence has been reported in the case of corporate spinoff (SP) announcements. This is surprising, as SP announcements are unexpected, and are also associated with a positive price jump in the...

This study analyzes the effectiveness of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in reducing possible profits from insider trading during takeover bids. Exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the introduction of the MAD, our event-study analysis on the Italian market suggests that the...

This study analyzes the effectiveness of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in reducing possible profits from insider trading during voluntary tender offers with the purpose of delisting initiated by controlling shareholders. Exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the introduction...

We examine corporate insider transactions around Sarbanes-Oxley §403 (SOX) regulatory regimes and subsequent Wall Street Journal (WSJ) media postings — and provide new evidence on the benefit/cost trade-off tension between private information transfer and stock trading costs. SOX increased...

These slides summarize a paper on opportunism by corporate insiders. We show that opportunistic insiders can be identified through the profitability of their trades prior to quarterly earnings announcements (QEAs), and that opportunistic trading is associated with various kinds of...

We examine insider trading profitability and common identity between insiders and top executives. In particular, we argue that common gender and the resultant social connections it creates influence access to private information, where insiders benefit from greater information sharing with top...

This paper investigates market reaction to, and insiders’ trading around, CEO succession events. Investors seem to react negatively to CEO resignation, but not to CEO retirement or death. Further, while investors do not react negatively to CEO turnover in high effective firms, their reaction...

We document pervasive informed trading activity in equity options before M&A announcements. About 25% of takeovers have positive abnormal volumes. These volume patterns indicate that informed traders are likely using bullish directional strategies for the target and volatility strategies for the...

Using a novel dataset containing U.S. companies’ regular board meeting schedules, we find evidence of informed trading by outside directors prior to board meetings. In the days prior to board meetings, when outside directors possess private information, they make purchases that yield higher...