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Consider a setting in which agents can each take one of two ordered actions and in which the incentive of any given agent to take the high action is positively reinforced by the number of other agents that take it. Furthermore, assume that we don't know any other details about the game being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839563
The classical secretary problem for selecting the best item is studied when the actual values of the items are observed with noise. One of the main appeals of the secretary problem is that the optimal strategy is able to find the best observation with the nontrivial probability of about 0.37,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839564
Assuming a `spectrum' or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839565
Every continuous-time stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform and limiting-average equilibrium payoff.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839566
Aumann--Serrano (2008) and Foster--Hart (2009) suggest two new riskiness measures, each of which enables one to elicit a complete and objective ranking of gambles according to their riskiness. Hart (2011) shows that both measures can be obtained by looking at a large set of utility functions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839567
The dominant computational approach to model operant learning and its underlying neural activity is model-free reinforcement learning (RL). However, there is accumulating behavioral and neuronal-related evidence that human (and animal) operant learning is far more multifaceted. Theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839568
Maximizing the revenue from selling two goods (or items) is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the single-good case. We show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the two goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813838
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813839
In operant learning, behaviors are reinforced or inhibited in response to the consequences of similar actions taken in the past. However, because in natural environments the “same” situation never recurs, it is essential for the learner to decide what “similar” is so that he can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813840
A new Secretary Problem is considered, where for fixed k and m one wins if at some time i = m(j .. 1) + 1 up to jm one selects one of the j best items among the first jm items, j = 1,...,k. Selection is based on relative ranks only. Interest lies in small k values, such as k = 2 or 3. This is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813841