We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed \epsilon 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider...

We provide Game-theoretic analysis of the arrival process to a multi-serve r system with a limited queue buffer, which admits customers only during a finite time interval. A customer who arrives at a full system is blocked and do es not receive service. Customers can choose their arrival times...

Biases such as the preference of a particular response for no obvious reason, are an integral part of psychophysics. Such biases have been reported in the common two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) experiments, where participants are instructed to compare two consecutively presented stimuli....

Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games with nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the invariance of...

We performed controlled experiments of human participants in a continuous sequence of ad auctions, similar to those used by Internet companies. The goal of the research was to understand users' strategies in making bids. We studied the behavior under two auction types: (1) the Generalized...

Many disputes involve conflicts of rights. A common view is that rights cannot really be in conflict so one of those being claimed must be a mistake. This idea leads to extreme outcomes that cut some parties out. Many studies have investigated how to choose a compromise among rights but they...

We consider a memoryless unobservable single-server queue where customers are homogeneous with respect to their reward (due to service completion) and with respect to their cost per unit of time of waiting. Left to themselves, it is well known that in equilibrium they will join the queue at a...

A Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses a distribution on nonnegative real numbers with given expectation, so as to maximize the probability that his realized choice is higher than his opponent's. These games arise in various competitive allocation setups (e.g.,...

While the very first consensus protocols for the synchronous model were designed to match the <I>worst-case</I> lower bound, deciding in exactly t+1 rounds in all runs, it was soon realized that they could be strictly improved upon by <I>early stopping</I> protocols. These dominate the first ones, by always...</i></i>

We introduce asymptotic analysis of stochastic games with short-stage duration. The play of stage $k$, $k\geq 0$, of a stochastic game $\Gamma_\delta$ with stage duration $\delta$ is interpreted as the play in time $k\delta\leq t<(k+1)\delta$, and therefore the average payoff of the $n$-stage play per unit of time is the sum of the payoffs in the first $n$ stages divided by $n\delta$, and the $\lambda$-discounted present value of a payoff $g$ in stage $k$ is $\lambda^{k\delta} g$. We define convergence, strong convergence, and exact convergence of the data of a family $(\Gamma_\delta)_{\delta>0}$ as the stage duration $\delta$ goes to $0$, and study the...</(k+1)\delta$,>