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The Principal-Agent Model with Multilateral Externalities : An Application to Climate Agreements

Helm, Carsten - 2014

We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059741

Multitasking : incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

Helm, Carsten; Wirl, Franz - In: Journal of economics 132 (2021) 1, pp. 41-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012419410

Multilateral externalities : contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

Helm, Carsten; Wirl, Franz - In: Economics letters 141 (2016), pp. 27-31

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616064

The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements

Helm, Carsten; Wirl, Franz - In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 67 (2014) 2, pp. 141-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010868991

The Principal-Agent Model with Multilateral Externalities: An Application to Climate Agreements

Helm, Carsten; Wirl, Franz - ZenTra - Center for Transnational Studies - 2014

We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an interna- tional climate agreement given private information about the willingness- to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739575