In this paper, we discuss a manager's allocation problem. Two managers allocate their heterogeneous employees - each manager allocates two high types and two low types - in groups of two in order to compete for an exogenous contest prize in a two period model. There are three possibilities of...

This paper presents a two-period model of talent investments where two clubs compete with respect to a contest prize. We show that two qualitatively different types of equilibria are possible using a closed-loop approach with strictly convex costs: The large market club invests in both periods...

This article describes a large number of contestants with high and low talent who individually decide to enter a contest or take their heterogeneous outside options. We derive a critical condition for which only high types, only low types, or both types participate in the contest. If a contest...

This paper presents a two-period model of talent investments in which two clubs compete for a contest prize. We show that multiple equilibria are possible, using a closed-loop approach with strictly convex costs: The large-market club invests in both periods more than the small-market club or...

This article presents a model of talent investments where two clubs compete for prizes. Our model is based on a general class of cost functions with a constant elasticity of marginal costs with respect to investments. The analysis finds that reduced revenue sharing improves competitive balance....