This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

We test if firms statistically discriminate workers based on race when em- ployer learning is asymmetric. Using data from the NLSY79, we find evidence of asymmetric employer learning. In addition, employers statistically discrimi- nate against non-college educated black workers at time of...

In the important contribution "All pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes" published in Games and Economic Behavior, May 2014, Minchuk and and Sela analyze an all pay auction with multiple prizes. The specific feature of the model is that all valuations are common except for the...

How does information asymmetry between firms regarding the quality (ability) of workers, determine the distribution of workers' qualities in those firms? We build a game theoretic model of information asymmetry between 2 representative firms competing in the labor market for labor inputs. In the...

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Our model features signaling in both one and two dimensions, where in the latter case firms have an...

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in the latter case firms have an informational...

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in the latter case firms have an informational...

In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. This, in turn introduces the possibility of misrepresentation. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model of self-reporting. A sender chooses an action and...

We test if firms statistically discriminate workers based on race when employer learning is asymmetric. Using data from the NLSY79, we find evidence of asymmetric employer learning. In addition, employers statistically discriminate against non-college educated black workers at time of hiring. We...