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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333881
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Auctioning process innovations when losers' bids determine royalty rates
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935644
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Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010
of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935649
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Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly
Hu, Luke - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571029
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License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2007 - April (revised) 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365856
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License auctions with royalty contracts for losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2006
licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371073
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Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333797
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Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers' Bids Determine Royalty Rates
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2009
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873