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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Reputation and Turnover
Rob, Rafael; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2004
is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers "discipline …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385306
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Reputation and Turnover
Rob, Rafael; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
is a noisy indicator of the firm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers ‘discipline …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020643
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GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy
Mariñoso, Begoña García; Jelovac, Izabela - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento … - 2000
hospitalised health care in two different types of health care systems: Systems where a GP referral is compulsory for specialist …/hospitalised attention and systems where this referral is only facultative. We model the dependence between the GPs’ diagnosis effort and … referral practice, and concentrate on the optimal contracts that induce the best behaviour from the public insurers’ point of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009292414
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955
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A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2008
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377059
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207