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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518

Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability

Bester, Helmut; Ouyang, Yaofu - 2017

This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

Trust and reputation under asymmetric information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494

Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351

Renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard and persistent private information

Strulovici, Bruno - 2011

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008807554

Renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard and persistent private information

Strulovici, Bruno - 2011

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823437

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information

Malcomson, James M. - 2015 - This version: July 24, 2015

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994