Does a worker who had a successful career have stronger or weaker incentives to manipulate his reputation than a worker … employment histories that lead to the same worker's reputation. (With reputation we refer to beliefs about the worker's future … productivity.) We show that, typically, workers with a better reputation have stronger incentives than workers with a worse …

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short …

I study how a firm manages its reputation by investing in the quality of its product and censoring bad news. Without …

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series … uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct … ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish …

We study a firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be … investment– depend only on the firm's reputation. MPE vary in frequency of certification and payoffs, but are generally …