This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the...

This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...

This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...

This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...

The purpose of this contribution is to illustrate how both Schelling and Bacharach’s methodologies can help scholars bring a new approach to behavioral game theory in which the nature of usual standard methodological individualism is insufficiently questioned. I aim to show that both Schelling...

The paper purports to stress how the two major contributions of Bacharach: "Variable Frame Theory" (VFT) and "Team Reasoning" (TR) improve Standard Non-Cooperative Game Theory in some relevant aspects which I point out. The aims are to show: (i) how Bacharach respectively justifies coordination...

This paper presents a methodology to study the identification of the content of focal points (Schelling 1960). This question is important for external validity and operationalising theories of decision making (e.g. team-reasoning and level-k). Choices implied by different concepts are mapped...

Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this...