This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the Pigou- Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general...

We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts that (a) contest entry and rent-seeking expenditures increase with the size of the prize; and (b) earnings are equalized between the contest and the outside option. While the...

This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior by comparing outcomes across several different networks. The network changes we consider are based on abstract examples illustrating the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We...

We conduct an experiment on price competition in a segmented market. Each segment contains one seller and one consumer, and consumers incur transportation costs when they buy from a seller located in another segment. We observe persistent price dispersion in our experimental markets with the...

This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the Pigou- Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general...

We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts that (a) contest entry and rent-seeking expenditures increase with the size of the prize; and (b) earnings are equalized between the contest and the outside option. While the...

This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior by comparing outcomes across several different networks. The network changes we consider are based on abstract examples illustrating the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We...

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

This paper investigates fundraising mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition as an incentive device for contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types...

Recent theoretical research on oligopolistic competition suggests that prices may increase when more firms compete in a market. However, this finding is based on comparative-static analyses of static models, which overlook the possibility that sellers may be able to charge supra-competitive...