punishment tournament, which, respectively, reward the best performer and punish the worst performer. We show that while the two … assignments. We use a principal-agent model to compare the efficiency of two tournament incentive schemes, reward tournament and … in punishment tournaments than in reward tournaments, and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation …

high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which … agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high … prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a …

high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which … agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high … prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a …

choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining high …

We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward stage, where punishments and rewards are risky …, individual risk aversion has no effect on the decision to punish or reward. This is good news for lab experiments who abstract …