In a paper published in the JFE in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They advocate using alternative methods for estimating risk-adjusted...

I examine whether market learning and M&A activity affect the association between shareholder rights and acquisition performance. Using a sample of acquisitions completed in the period of 1990-2006, I find that the negative association between governance indices and bidder returns disappears in...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of value-based performance measures – economic value added (EVA), market value added (MVA) and cash value added (CVA) – with corporate governance using data on 41 corporations listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange-100 Index....

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we show that the reduction in shareholder litigation risk deteriorates firms' stock price informativeness. This reduction in stock price informativeness is due to firms changing the way they invest rather than...

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks...

I analyze the current prevalence of the concept of shareholder value maximization in Brazil from the normative, case law, and managerial perspectives. On the normative aspect, I show that Brazilian corporate law is much closer to a balanced and socially oriented perspective for the role of...

Controlling shareholders often pledge their ownership in the firm to offer collateral for either their personal loans or loans to the firm. Pledging of shares modifies their payoff structure, without altering their control rights. This modification in the payoff structure can influence the...

We find that classified board in the M&A target firm is positively related to the target shareholder value, but only for firms with both intensive R&D investment and strong external governance. We also find that firms with classified board exhibit superior quality innovation when they have both...