We use a multitude of tax reforms across OECD countries as natural experiments to estimate the market value of the tax benefits of debt financing. We report time-series evidence that tax reforms are followed by large changes in the value of corporate equity. However, the impact of tax reforms is...

We investigate the employment consequences of private equity buyouts. We find that, on average, buyouts by politically connected private equity firms are associated with higher job creation at the establishments operated by their target firms than buyouts by non-connected private equity firms....

We extend the literature on how managerial traits relate to corporate choices by documenting that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs. Additionally, transitions from male to female...

Using a newly assembled 50 country firm-level database spanning 19 years, we document a “bright side” for employees of business group affiliated firms: less pronounced fluctuations in employment than unaffiliated firms in response to macroeconomic shocks. The results are robust to a variety...

We study how political factors can shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition rules reduce prices, but do not hurt the quality of services or...

Many firms voluntarily incur the costs of attempting to influence politicians. However, estimates of the value of political connections have been made in only a few extreme cases. We propose a new approach to valuing political ties that builds on these previous studies. We consider connected to...

We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD countries. Results indicate that governments typically transfer ownership rights without relinquishing proportional control. Control is commonly retained by leveraging state investments through pyramids, dual-class shares, and...

We regress leverage on an index of corporate exposure to expropriation by the controlling shareholder - the ratio of his ownership rights O to his control rights C - and on an index of creditor rights. Amongst corporations that can access related party loans, a lower O/C ratio increases leverage...

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the ways in which companies respond to financial distress by restructuring their assets (through asset sales, mergers or liquidations) or liabilities during an economy-wide crisis. We contrast financial and corporate governance considerations...

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that,...