For markets to work, buyers must know when products are of high quality. This paper provides a theoretical framework for studying the consequences of the certifier's identity, the characteristics of the best certifier, and the identity of the equilibrium certifier. A certifier that cares about...

We investigate ratings quality across uncertain and normal times proxied by variations in economic policy uncertainty. We find that increased policy uncertainty is associated with weaker rating standards. This finding is unrelated to variations in macroeconomic conditions and holds when we use...

The government-sponsored Five-Star Quality Rating System (FSQRS) aggregates multiple measures of nursing home quality into a standardized overall rating. Previous research has found that the FSQRS affected consumer demand and correspondingly motivated a strategic shift towards competing for...

In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008 has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interest in the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) in which there are three...

It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...

The present analysis sheds light on the setting up a regional rating agency in Asia in the wake of recent financial crisis. We investigate the policy facing a financial regulator while evaluating whether or not to admit new entrants into the credit rating market. In an incomplete contracting...

Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing a symmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If...

We exploit the introduction of a "risks and challenges" (RC) section on the crowdfunding website Kickstarter.com to study the role of disclosure in markets characterized by severe information asymmetries and agency frictions. Although the RC section contains voluntary and unaudited disclosures,...