all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto …

the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the …

with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [indifference with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and … consistency] or [Pareto indifference and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove … with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 3). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further …

characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two …