This paper presents several methods and discusses salient issues pertaining to the use of reduced-form models to estimate overcharges in antitrust matters (e.g., price-fixing) where “but-for” prices may be less than actual prices during the anticompetitive period. In particular, two common...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies....

The European Court of Justice's definition of when a firm has a dominant position has recently come under attack as being meaningless and impossible to measure. We argue that both attacks are wrong, suggest an economic interpretation of domination and propose how it may be measured using modern...

This papers studies the effects on service quality and consumer surplus of a minimum price which is fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional assocation will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand...

Our one-page reply to Whinston and Siegal's forthcoming AER article correcting and elaborating our 1991 AER article.

The corporate leniency program has played an important role in detecting cartels that damages consumer welfare and competition. This study investigates the impacts of Korea¡¯s leniency revision in 2005 on cartel stability by using a Poisson regression. The estimation results show that the new...

Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...

While private actions for damages against price-cartels by direct and indirect customers receive much attention, it is largely unresolved to what extent other groups that are negatively affected may claim compensation. This paper focuses on probably the most important one: suppliers to a...

This paper studies cartels’ strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that...