This paper studies the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some...

We study the polyhedral structure of variants of the discrete lot-sizing problem viewed as special cases of convex integer programs. Our approach in studying convex integer programs is to develop results for simple mixed integer sets that can be used to model integer convex objective functions....

Strategic investment is studied in a model where oligopolists take decisions sequentially. First period investment determines second period wealth and output, and this is anticipated correctly by Cournot oligopolists. In our model with linear technology firms invest less as competition...

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.