In this paper we consider a model of oligopolistic competition where firms make a two-dimensional product line decision. They choose a location in style space, thus, inducing horizontal differentiation, and produce different qualities (a product line) of a given good (vertical differentiation),...

This paper addresses the issue of optimum population with two concerns : avoiding both the absolute repugnant solution that amounts to giving to an infinite number an infinitesimal amount and the marginal repugnant solution in which equilibrium consumption decresases with income. To avoid these...

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information, Nash-Walras equilibria...

We consider two typed of cities. In the European one the amenities are located at the city-center ( like e.g. Paris or London) whereas in the American-type city the amenites are at the city-edge (like e.g. Detroit, Los Angeles). We first show that the unemploymed reside at the vicinity of the...

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...