Oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi-principal common agency framework, where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer. We first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games, and a parameterization...

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R&D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are...

In this note we compare, at given costs, the welfare effects of two policies aiming at reducing unvoluntary unemployment: unemployment benefits allocated to unemployed workers alld employment subsidies allocated to firms.

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auctions and public goods problems with semi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents

Properties of stochastic outcome functions are exploited to solve the moral hazard problem in teams under unobservable individual actions and different individual objectives. Two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: Enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through...

We analyse the sharing of an uncertain joint output among risk-neutral members of a team whose actions are not observable. Adapting techniques used to treat the pure adverse selection problem to this team moral hazard problem, we define a first condition that is sufficient to implement a first...