For an industry producing a single homogeneous good, we define and characterize the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. This parameterization will appear to be equivalent to the one used in the empirical...

Oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi-principal common agency framework, where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer. We first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games, and a parameterization...

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auctions and public goods problems with semi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents

Properties of stochastic outcome functions are exploited to solve the moral hazard problem in teams under unobservable individual actions and different individual objectives. Two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: Enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through...