We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic...

In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy...

This paper analyzes strategic interactions and contagion effects in the peripheral countries of a monetary union. Using game theory and cost-benefit analysis, the paper determines the set of equilibrium solutions under which country-specific shocks are transmitted to other member countries...

The chapter first introduces Tarantelli’s thought on the role of labour economics and social pacts. The implementation of his proposals for a social pact in Italy is then discussed and compared to similar experiences in Europe. Attention is finally devoted to developing a theory of social...

The chapter presents a model, where the union is interested in the level of wages, employment and the level of public expenditure. Social pacts are shown not only to lead to a superior macroeconomic performance, but to be also acceptable by unions. The key to their acceptability lies in the...