of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff …

rationalized in a voting model with diverse constituents. One would think that commitment to finishing the metro line (no matter …, when commitment is needed). More generally, we prove a theorem for binary-choice trees and arbitrary learning, establishing … that no plan of action which is majority-preferred to the equilibrium play without commitment can be a Condorcet winner …

(overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global …&D collaborators. We utilize the perfectly-coalition-proof-Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria … multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands. …

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. …