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The Philosophical, Ethical and Economic Foundations of Ethical Investment

Dupre, Denis - 2008

Ethical awareness is growing and the word itself seems to be spreading to all walks of life. In medicine and economics a myriad of ethical committees have sprouted in an attempt to control the potential excesses of science or business transactions. How can one explain this craze for a word that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012727823

Strategy and Stance : A Framework for Understanding Public Advocacy

Conner, Roger L. - 2005

This paper proposes a new framework to analyze the behavior of quot;public advocatesquot;, defined as professionals who seek to influence public policy on behalf of the public interest. Using the framework, it describes systemic pressures that lead public advocates to overuse adversarial,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735872

Optimal Contracting With Endogenous Social Norms

Fischer, Paul E. - 2008

Research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers. Within an agency framework, we model endogenous social norms by assuming each agent's cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action, defined to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774498

Group Identification with (Incomplete) Preferences

Cho, Wonki Jo - 2017

We consider the problem of identifying members of a group based on individual opinions. Since agents do not have preferences in the model, properties of rules that concern preferences (e.g., strategy-proofness and efficiency) have not been studied in the literature. We fill this gap by working...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951982

Dream Teams and the Apollo Effect

Gershkov, Alex - 2017

We model leadership selection, competition, and decision making in teams with heterogeneous membership composition. We show that if the choice of leadership in a team is imprecise or noisy—which may arguably be the case if appointment decisions are made by non-expert administrators—then it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960092

On the Heterogeneity of People’s (Dis)honest Behavior Along Two Dimensions : Cost of Lying and Cost of Acquiring Information

Barcelo, Helene - 2019

This paper studies lying in a novel context. Previous work has focused on situations in which people are either fully aware of the economic consequences of all available actions (e.g., die-under-cup paradigm), or they are uncertain, but this uncertainty cannot be cleared in any way (e.g.,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900349

Increasing Altruistic and Cooperative Behaviour with Simple Moral Nudges

Capraro, Valerio - 2019

The conflict between pro-self and pro-social behaviour is at the core of many key problems of our time, as, for example, the reduction of air pollution and the redistribution of scarce resources. For the well-being of our societies, it is thus crucial to find mechanisms to promote pro-social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900728

Overlapping Climate Clubs Under Transaction Costs

Delfino Silva, Emilson - 2019

(overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global …&D collaborators. We utilize the perfectly-coalition-proof-Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria … multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892264

Time Pressure and Honesty in a Deception Game

Capraro, Valerio - 2019

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899234

When Bribes are Harmless : The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design

Gorokh, Artur - 2019

Collusion has long been the Achilles heel of mechanism design, as most results break down when participating agents can collude. The issue is more severe when monetary transfers (bribes) between agents are feasible, wherein it is known that truthful revelation and efficient allocation are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899989