Bi-cooperative games have been introduced by Bilbao as a generalization of classical cooperative games, where each player can participate positively to the game (defender), negatively (defeater), or do not participate (abstentionist). In a voting situation (simple games), they coincide with...

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian...

Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator represents a ‘power function’ constrained by monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We bound their cardinality above by a Ramsey number and show this...

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation....

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>International Journal of Game Theory</I>, 39, 445-466.<P> See also ''An Axiomatization of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure'', in: Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice (ed. H. de Swart), pp....</p></i>

In this paper, we introduce a general framework for situations with decision making under uncertainty and cooperation possibilities. This framework is based upon a two stage stochastic programming approach. We show that under relatively mild assumptions the cooperative games associated with...

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations.In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player's cost...

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...

In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity.We show that if a game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector is a core element.Furthermore we refine the concept of permutational convexity and show that this refinement...

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down...