We use a novel experiment to investigate whether people aim to coordinate when, to do so, they have to lie; and are …

feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for …

We use a novel experiment to investigate whether people aim to coordinate when, to do so, they have to lie; and are …

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … underreporting many principals seem to exhibit lying aversion which renders their feedback informative. Therefore, the agents respond …

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … underreporting many principals seem to exhibit lying aversion which renders their feedback informative. Therefore, the agents respond …

motives and envy. Children with stronger social preferences are less prone to deception, even when lying would benefit others … accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample … of children aged between 7 and 14, we find strong aversion to lying at all ages. Lying is driven mainly by selfish …

fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which … agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution … the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite. …