Showing 31 - 40 of 906
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444292
We study the effects of affirmative action through endogenous set-asides. We propose a share auction for dual sourcing in which more intensive affirmative action strengthens the favoured provider. This has the potential to level the playing field and induce more competitive procurement overall....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389690
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392402
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer´s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427146
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520621
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003726021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003754170
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780356
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view information provision is a risky attempt to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780387
In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible effort in order to increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of the win probability in the literature is the so-called "logitʺ contest success function. We provide a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780397