When private firms are acquired, buyers commonly rely on seller financing and earnouts. Using a novel database of private acquisitions, I find that seller financing and earnouts become more common as information asymmetry increases between the acquirer and the target. Financial statement audits...

Automotive manufacturers are known to use deadline-based convex incentives to motivate dealerships to sell new cars. This paper shows that dealerships respond to these incentive targets by pushing customers from used to new cars as the end of the month approaches, and that subprime loans written...

This paper presents a model in which asymmetric information and extreme uncertainty lead to the exclusive use of equity and riskless debt for small business financing. The paper derives these results without any restrictions on the available contract space, the distribution function governing a...

Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in effects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, banks dissipate anticipated profit from serving locked-in borrowers...

This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral-hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the...

Tests of Leland and Pyle's (1977) signaling model in the public setting face a number of empirical challenges. We revisit the implications of their model with new evidence from a setting in which entrepreneurs sell their firms in private transactions. In this setting, it is common for sellers to...

This paper examines whether firm reputation impacts borrowing costs and thus investment. Using unique data from Fortune's Most Admired Companies surveys, I find that reputable borrowers enjoy lower borrowing costs and receive more favorable loan contract terms. My identification strategy is...

We examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms' early public years when they are lesser known. Our evidence suggests that retaining a Big Six auditor, which can reduce debt monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of financial statements, enables young firms to lower their...

Which financial frictions matter in the aggregate? This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance a firm with a long-term contract. The contract is constrained efficient because firm revenue is costly to monitor and entrepreneurs may default. The cost of...

We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in...