Technology firms often decide between being open or closed to third party application development. Building on a two-sided market model with competing platforms, I show that firms might prefer to restrict third party application development despite the fact that allowing it is free and increases...

Entry into a network industry is modeled, focusing on consumers' expectations formation. Equilibrium expectations are endogenous and they depend on prices, acting as a coordination device among consumers. The model is able to account for aggressive pricing policies by the incumbent and by the...

In Illinois Tool Works and Trident v. Independent Ink, the Supreme Court overturned its longstanding per se rule against tied sales by a firm with a patent. Henceforth, market power will have to be demonstrated, whether or not the firm has a patent. Upon such demonstration, a tied sales contract...

In some industries, monopoly is natural. One provider can serve the relevant demand cheaper than two or more firms. If the monopoly is not contestable, i.e. not controlled by a credible threat of entry, regulation is necessary. The essential facilities doctrine is one such regulatory tool. It...

Strong network effects generate multiple tipping equilibria, in which firms compete for the adoption of all consumers rather than the marginal consumer. In this scenario, a quality distortion—the Spence distortion—should be absent; this contradicts the well-established Spence distortion...

Agency and wholesale models are widely adopted vertical contractual agreements. This paper compares the private incentives and social welfare of these two business models by highlighting the differences in move order and price structure. With a monopoly platform, the agency model dominates the...

I model dynamic product design along price and non-price dimensions by a firm in a market with positive network externalities between consumers. In the case of a usage fee, I provide conditions under which the steady state (SS) is unique and show that the introductory price is negative and...

If a monopolist (any manufacturer with downward-sloping demand) cannot commit to a wholesale price in advance, even competitive retailers will be reluctant to enter the market, knowing that once they have entered, the monopolist has incentive to choose a higher price and reduce their...

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...