We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision...

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a characteristic function which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in the case of...

We propose two classes of allocation games for N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agents’ private information. In both models, agents make non-verifiable claims about their types and effective deposits of consumption goods, which are...

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...