firms, prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of … Singh and Vives (1984, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546–554) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is …

allow for elastic demand functions. A Bertrand-type model and a Cournot-type model are considered. If firms choose location … in Cournot than Bertrand under the whole parameters’ set. We also study the impact of firms’ location on perfect …

We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms … differentiated duopoly setting, partial privatization always improves welfare in Cournot but not necessarily in Bertrand competition. …-maximizing public firm's price is strictly lower while its output is strictly higher in Cournot competition. And whereas the private …

market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption … ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If the cost of … technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing …

We revisit the classic profit-ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and the issue of endogenous choice of a price … firm earns higher (lower) profit under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Therefore, unless network …, Cournot equilibrium always constitutes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). However, a prisoners's dilemma type of …

Cournot and Bertrand competition. Delegation with 'own-performance' based incentive schemes always leads to early adoption in … markets with Bertrand competition compared to that under no-delegation, but not necessarily so in markets with Cournot … competition. It also shows that the ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in terms of delay in adoption depends on the type …