This paper provides a dynamic theory of the effects of organizational capacity on public policy. Consistent with prevailing accounts, a bureaucratic organization with higher capacity, i.e., a better ability to get things done, is more likely to deliver projects in a timely, predictable, or...

Models with adaptive agents have become increasingly popular in computational sociology (e.g. Macy 1991, Macy and Flache 2002). In this paper we show that at least two important kinds of such models lack empirical content. In the first type players adjust via reinforcement learning: they adjust...

In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates...

We develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition. In each period of the game, an interest group attempts to "buy" an incumbent's policy choice, and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger. The voter faces a...

Organizational capacity is critical to the effective implementation of policy. Consequently, strategic legislators and bureaucrats must take capacity into account in designing programs. This article develops a theory of endogenous organizational capacity. Capacity is modeled as an investment...

The so-called "paradox of voting" is major anomaly for rational choice theories of elections. If voting is costly and citizens are rational then large electorates the expected turnout would be small, for if many people voted the chance of anyone being pivotal would be too small to make the act...

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting...