Showing 41 - 48 of 48
Models with adaptive agents have become increasingly popular in computational sociology (e.g. Macy 1991, Macy and Flache 2002). In this paper we show that at least two important kinds of such models lack empirical content. In the first type players adjust via reinforcement learning: they adjust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028505
Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on "wedge" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204332
This paper provides a dynamic theory of the effects of organizational capacity on public policy. Consistent with prevailing accounts, a bureaucratic organization with higher capacity, i.e., a better ability to get things done, is more likely to deliver projects in a timely, predictable, or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263619
This paper develops a dynamic theory of the interaction of organizational capacity and its institutional context. Higher capacity enables organizations to deliver projects efficiently, while institutional barriers allow opposing interests to reallocate project payoffs at the cost of delays....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014456353
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013485031
Turf wars commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044424
We examine the relationship between parliamentary seats and cabinet posts in European governments between 1946 and 2001. Our specification improves on past studies in two respects. First, it derives and uses the voting weights of the underlying coalition formation games. This reduces the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076279
We study an under-utilized source of data on legislative effectiveness, and exploit its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We find that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms even after controlling for legislators institutional positions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067094