We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...

We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...

In the move to adopt rights based arrangements for renewable resources to avoid the losses of open access and the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation, we argue that grandfathering the allotments of local users can be the most efficient distribution mechanism. We differ from the standard...

This paper builds on the framework developed by Anderson and McChesney (1994) to analyze two sovereigns bargaining over the use of scarce resources. We adapt the "raid or trade" model of disputes over land to the high seas fisheries context, where sovereigns must decide whether to continue the...

This paper summarizes and synthesizes the role of markets in facilitating climate change adaptation. It explains how market signals encourage adaptation through land markets. It also identifies impediments to critical market signals, provides related policy recommendations, and points to...

In their book, The Narrow Corridor, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson contend that prosperity requires a rule of law that threads the needle between anarchy and despotism. We emphasize that creating that rule of law is a process in which society—the citizens of a sovereign state—is in a race...

We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...