This paper models asset markets as a game where assets pay according to an arbitrary payoff matrix,investors decide on fractions of wealth to allocate to each asset,and prices result from market clearing. The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is to split wealth proportionally to the...

I study the robustness of Rubinstein´s (1989) E-Mail Game results towards rough inductive reasoning. Rough induction is a form of boundedly rational reasoning where a player does not carry out every inductive step. The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions...

We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results...

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-de?ned extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying ?niteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which (a) extensive forms can be de?ned and (b) all pure strategy combinations induce...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitaion process, containing their results as special cases, and extending them...

This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information . The problem can...

Cet article presente des elements pour jalonner la comprehension des formes et de certains facteurs de developpement des cooperations inter-entreprises. Apres la presentation d'une grille de lecture des cooperations integrant les dimensions de variete et de variabilite, nous distinguons...

Ce cahier tente de presenter une contribution multidisciplinaire (exploratoire), a la definition de la cooperation et du comportement du cooperant. L 'ensemble des disciplines prises en reference concourent a donner une vision de la cooperation qui rompt avec la definition sous l'angle de la...

Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation...

The autors study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the efficiency of the rate of population growth. They show that if quantity and quality are inversely related then, even in the case of full altruism within the family, population growth is...