We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable,...

We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptography when applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machines and assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk...

This paper compares the welfare effects of ad valorem and per unit commodity taxation, in a model of oligopolistic interaction. Our main result is that, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high, per unit taxes welfare dominate ad valorem taxes.

Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that players make small errors when playing their strategies, or assuming that there is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same...

In this paper we show that in a simple spacital model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if The outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The...

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependant utility functions are a better predictor of behaviour than expected uitlity. In particular, loss aversion is an important element of such utility functions. We extend...

The authors study market games with multiple posts per commodity. They provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show some interesting results.

Purely non-cooperative principles, as itereted dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

In this paper we show, via some simple examples, that also in the class of games we are dealing with, there are perfect equilibria that are not proper and, moreover, some "proper" outcome is not induced by any stable set. Furthermore, we xhow that the perfect concept does not appear restrictive...

Ce papier presente un modele d'equilibre general de concurrence imparfaite dans une economie d'echange avec generations imbriquees. La concurrence imparfaite se traduit par la regle de fixation du prix des jeux strategiques du marche a la Shapley-shubik. Apres avoir presente le modele et defini...