Waiting times for elective (non-emergency) treatments are a key health policy concern in several OECD countries. This study describes common measures on waiting times across OECD countries from administrative data. It focuses on common elective procedures, like hip and knee replacement, and...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU which recently passed a new law on a patient's right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

Hospital bed‐blocking occurs when hospital patients are ready to be discharged to a nursing home, but no place is available, so that hospital care acts as a more costly substitute for long‐term care. We investigate the extent to which greater supply of nursing home beds or lower prices can...

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the...

Abstract We analyse the properties of optimal price adjustment to hospitals when no lump-sum transfers are allowed and when prices differ to reflect observable exogenous differences in costs. We find that: (a) when the marginal benefit from treatment is decreasing and the cost function is the...

In many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In this paper we study semi-altruistic firms’...

We study the relationship between competition and quality within a spatial competition framework where firms compete in prices and quality. We generalise existing literature on spatial price-quality competition along several dimensions, including utility functions that are non-linear in income...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri?able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...

Activity-based funding involves remunerating healthcare providers a fixed price per patient in each payment category. However, no categorisation system can account perfectly for differences in patient complexity. Differences may be systematic if providers routinely attract high-risk patients or...