This paper focuses on risk information campaigns familiarizing consumers with hazardous product attributes and compares policies advocating voluntary and mandatory displays of warning messages. The food allergen labeling campaign provides an opportunity to focus on the availability and...

We deal with a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a General Practitioner (GP). In this framework, we study the role of GPs as filters for secondary care, emphasizing the implications that patients' information may have for health...

The questions addressed in this paper are related to access rules to primary care services and the potential for patient driven competition between GPs and specialists. Most of the literature on the performance of primary care has dealt with reforming payment schemes, little attention being paid...

This paper explores the dynamics of transparency. It asks why some government-created systems of disclosure improve over time while others stagnate or degenerate into costly paperwork exercises. Transparency policies inevitably begin as unlikely compromises. Though transparency is universally...

The Enron scandal has raised questions regarding the adequacy of the present system of financial disclosure. At the same time, public policies increasingly use information disclosure as a regulatory device in a variety of areas beyond financial reporting. This paper provides a framework for...

Regulatory transparency - mandatory disclosure of information by private or public institutions with a regulatory intent - has become an important frontier of government innovation. This paper assesses the effectiveness of such transparency systems by examining the design and impact of financial...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...

We deal with a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a General Practitioner (GP). In this framework, we study the role of GPs as filters for secondary care, emphasizing the implications that patients' information may have for health...

This paper analyses simultaneous regulation of cost and quality when firms have private, correlated information about productivity and the regulator receives a signal about quality. It is shown that managerial effort and expenditures on quality are positively correlated in the optimal contract....

Induction demand phenomena has usually been considered like a doctor?s moral hazard behaviours. The first result of this paper is to reveal that these phenomena is a simple adverse selection problem. Thanks to the fact that health state is an argument of the doctor?s utility, we build a...