The presence of private information about a firm can affect the competition among potential lenders. In the Sharpe (1990) model of information asymmetry among lenders (with the von Thadden (2004) correction), an uninformed outside bank faces a winner’s curse when competing with an informed...

How do banks react to increased interbank competition? Recent banking theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on bank orientation - i.e., the choice of relationship based versus transactional banking - and bank industry specialization. We empirically investigate the...

This Selected Issues paper reviews the financial sector development in Georgia in recent years, and investigates why it has lagged behind economic development, as well as developments in more advanced transition economies. The paper briefly reviews recent financial sector development in Georgia,...

This paper presents an update to the Financial System Stability Assessment (FSAP) on the Republic of Belarus. The paper reveals that the Belarusian financial sector has so far weathered the ongoing turmoil well, reflecting its relatively closed nature and the dominant role of state-owned banks....

The Central Bank of Tunisia's (CBT) liquidity support contributed to rapid credit growth in Tunisia and an uptick in inflation. The Tunisian economy is expected to recover gradually. Banking sector vulnerabilities are much higher, and stress tests indicate that the banking sector may face large...

Portugal’s financial system is sound, well-managed and competitive, with shorter-term risks and vulnerabilities well contained, and with the system buttressed by a strong financial policy framework. Portuguese banks’ profitability, asset quality, and solvency have held up well in...

This paper views financial intermediaries as vertically integrated firms. The authors explore how competitive conditions in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for (upstream) originators and (downstream) fund managers to integrate. The underlying tradeoff in our model is...

The paper examines the slowdown of lending by large U.S. banks over the period 2007Q3 - 2009Q2, focusing on: (i) whether capital or liquidity was the binding constraint; (ii) factors influencing banks’ decision to hold capital; and (iii) their pricing behavior. Using quarterly data for...

In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of...

We study the welfare properties of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard that encompasses incentive mechanisms for bank risk-taking studied in a large partial equilibrium literature. We show that competitive equilibriums maximize welfare and yield an optimal level of banks' risk...