A discussion of the hypotheses that high levels of interbank exposure reduce the safety and soundness of the banking system and that interbank exposure affects the ability of the FDIC to use market discipline as a constraint on banks' risk-taking, with comment on Fourth Federal Reserve District...

The need for federal deposit insurance is often based on the claim that it prevents bank runs and makes the banking system more stable. But research shows that banks could prevent bank runs by constructing their deposit contracts appropriately, and, in the absence of deposit insurance, they...

An examination of the contributions of economic and managerial factors to commercial bank failures in the 1980s.

An analysis of the costs and benefits of providing federal deposit insurance as a means of preventing widespread bank failures, and the role of bank regulators in assuring bank solvency; article concludes with February 15 issue.

A critical analysis of the probable effects of national depositor preference--a provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993--showing that although the FDIC may experience some cost savings in the short term, the long-term benefits are likely to be greatly diminished.

A discussion of the fundamental economic principles to consider in evaluating proposals to reform the current system of federal deposit insurance.

A discussion of how the FDIC's policies for handling bank failures can have unintended, and undesirable, effects on the banking system.

Several studies have explored whether the banking panics of the Great Depression caused some institutions to fail that might otherwise have survived. This paper adopts a different approach and investigates whether the panics resulted in the failure and liquidation of banks that might otherwise...